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JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERPRETATIONS OF LAWt
THE HONORABLE ANTONIN SCALIA**
When I was invited to speak here at Duke Law School, I had originally intended to give a talk that reflected upon the relationship among
the Bork confirmation hearings, the proposed federal salary increase,
capital punishment, Roe v. Wade, and Law and Astrology. I was advised, however, that the subject of this lecture series is administrative
law, and so have had to limit myself accordingly. Administrative law is
not for sissies-so you should lean back, clutch the sides of your chairs,
and steel yourselves for a pretty dull lecture. There will be a quiz
afterwards.
Five Terms ago, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in the case of
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC,I which announced the principle that the
courts will accept an agency's reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous
terms of a statute that the agency administers. Dealing with the question
whether the Environmental Protection Agency could permissibly adopt
the "bubble concept"-that is, a plantwide definition of "stationary
source"-under the Clean Air Act, Justice Stevens for a unanimous
Court adopted an analytical approach that deals with the problem of judicial deference to agency interpretations of law in two steps:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,2 must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.
t Duke Law Journal Administrative Law Lecture, delivered at Duke University School of
Law, January 24, 1989. Copyright © 1989 by Antonin Scalia. Printed with permission of the
author.
** Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court.
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. Id. at 842-43 (footnote omitted).
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Failing an affirmative response to the first inquiry, the Chevron analysis moves to step two:
If, however, the court determines that Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose
its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible con3
struction of the statute.
Chevron has proven a highly important decision-perhaps the most
important in the field of administrative law since Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC.4 In the first three and a half years after its
announcement-up to the beginning of 1988-Chevron was cited by
lower federal courts over 600 times. 5 Chevron has been a source of lively
debate on my own Court, centering largely on the question whether it
applies with full force (as I believe it does) when the controversy involves
a "pure question of statutory construction."' 6 In a case in which Justice
Kennedy did not participate last Term, this question equally divided the
eight remaining members of the Court.7 Because Justice Stevens is not
here to reply, it would be unfair of me to address that particular issue,
but I do want to explore with you the general theoretical underpinnings
of Chevron and some of its practical implications.
It should not be thought that the Chevron doctrine-except in the
clarity and the seemingly categorical nature of its expression-is entirely
new law. To the contrary, courts have been content to accept "reasonable" executive interpretations of law for some time. Consider the following description of judicial review of administrative action, written
almost fifty years ago by the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, whose Report formed the basis for enactment of our
basic charter of administrative law, the Administrative Procedure Act:
3. Id. at 843 (footnotes omitted).
4. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
5. See Byse, JudicialReview ofAdministrativeInterpretationofStatutes An Analysis of Chevron'sStep Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 255 (1988).
6. Compare INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987) (courts may use "traditional
tools of statutory construction" to supplant agency's interpretation of congressional intent with judicial interpretation) with id. at 454 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("courts must give effect to a reasonable
agency interpretation of a statute unless that interpretation is inconsistent with a clearly expressed

congressional intent").
7. Compare NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 108 S.Ct. 413,
421 (1988) (advocating that judges determine congressional intent by using "traditional tools of

statutory construction") with id. at 426 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & White & O'Connor,
JJ., concurring) (courts should determine whether an agency's interpretation of a statute ispermissible, not correct).
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Even on questions of law [independent judicial] judgment seems
not to be compelled. The question of statutory interpretation might be
approached by the court de novo and given the answer which the court
thinks to be the "right interpretation." Or the court might approach
it, somewhat as a question of fact, to ascertain, not the "right interpretation," but only whether the administrative interpretation has substantial support. Certain standards of interpretation guide in that
direction. Thus, where the statute is reasonably susceptible of more
than one interpretation, the court may accept that of the administrative body. Again, the administrative interpretation is to be given
weight-not merely as the opinion of some men or even of a lower
tribunal, but as the opinion of the body especially familiar with the
problems dealt with by the statute and burdened with the duty of enforcing it. This may be legislation deals
with complex matters calling
8
for expert knowledge and judgment.
That was written, as I say, almost half a century ago, and was an accurate description of the caselaw. Judge Henry Friendly observed the same
landscape thirty years later, when he wrote:
We think it is time to recognize ...that there are two lines of Supreme
Court decisions on this subject which are analytically in conflict, with
the result that a court of appeals must choose the one it deems more
appropriate for the case at hand. Leading cases support[ ] the view
that great deference must be given to the decisions of an administrative
agency applying a statute to the facts and that such decisions can be
reversed only if without rational basis .... However, there is an impressive body of law sanctioning free substitution of judicial for administrative judgment
when the question involves the meaning of a
9
statutory term.
Chevron, if its categorical language is to be believed, and if the Court
intends to stand by it, essentially chose between these two conflicting
lines of decision.

It is not immediately apparent why a court should ever accept the
judgment of an executive agency on a question of law. Indeed, on its face
the suggestion seems quite incompatible with Marshall's aphorism that
"[ult is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is."1 Surely the law, that immutable product of Congress, is what it is, and its content-ultimately to be decided by the
courts-cannot be altered or affected by what the Executive thinks about
it. I suppose it is harmless enough to speak about "giving deference to
the views of the Executive" concerning the meaning of a statute, just as
we speak of "giving deference to the views of the Congress" concerning
8. S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 90-91 (1941).
9. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976), aff'd sub nor.
Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977).
10. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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the constitutionality of particular legislation-the mealy-mouthed word
"deference" not necessarily meaning anything more than considering
those views with attentiveness and profound respect, before we reject
them. But to say that those views, if at least reasonable, will ever be
binding-that is, seemingly, a striking abdication of judicial responsibility.
This deep-rooted feeling that it is the judges who must say what the
law is accounts, I have no doubt, for the stubborn refusal of lawyers, and
even of Congress, to admit that courts ever accept executive interpretation. For example, despite the Attorney General's Committee's description of current law that I quoted earlier, one provision of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) itself seems to have been based
upon the quite mistaken assumption that questions of law would always
be decided de novo by the courts. You may have wondered why the
APA's required notice-and-comment procedures for rulemaking-probably. the most significant innovation of the legislation-contain an exception for "interpretative rules." One of the reasons given in the 1945
Senate Print is as follows: "'[I]nterpretative' rules-as merely interpretations of statutory provisions-are subject to plenary judicial review
"....
IIThat is not true today, and it was not categorically true in 1945.
What, then, is the theoretical justification for allowing reasonable
administrative interpretations to govern? The cases, old and new, that
accept administrative interpretations, often refer to the "expertise" of the
agencies in question, their intense familiarity with the history and purposes of the legislation at issue, their practical knowledge of what will
best effectuate those purposes. In other words, they are more likely than
the courts to reach the correct result. That is, if true, a good practical
reason for accepting the agency's views, but hardly a valid theoretical
justification for doing so. If I had been sitting on the Supreme Court
when Learned Hand was still alive, it would similarly have been, as a
practical matter, desirable for me to accept his views in all of his cases
under review, on the basis that he is a lot wiser than I, and more likely to
get it right. But that would hardly have been theoretically valid. Even if
Hand would have been defacto superior, I would have been ex officio so.
So also with judicial acceptance of the agencies' views. If it is, as we have
always believed, the constitutional duty of the courts to say what the law
is, we must search for something beyond relative competence as a basis
for ignoring that principle when agency action is at issue.
One possible validating rationale that has been suggested in some
11.

S.Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1946).
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recent articles12-and that can perhaps even be derived from some of the
language of Chevron itself 13-is that the constitutional principle of separation of powers requires Chevron. The argument goes something like
this: When, in a statute to be implemented by an executive agency, Congress leaves an ambiguity that cannot be resolved by text or legislative
history, the "traditional tools of statutory construction," the resolution
of that ambiguity necessarily involves policy judgment. Under our democratic system, policy judgments are not for the courts but for the political branches; Congress having left the policy question open, it must be
answered by the Executive.
Now there is no one more fond of our system of separation of powers than I am, but even I cannot agree with this approach. To begin
with, it seems to me that the "traditional tools of statutory construction"
include not merely text and legislative history but also, quite specifically,
the consideration of policy consequences. Indeed, that tool is so traditional that it has been enshrined in Latin: "Ratio est legis anima; mutata
legis ratione mutatur et lex. " ("The reason for the law is its soul; when
the reason for the law changes, the law changes as well.") Surely one of
the most frequent justifications courts give for choosing a particular construction is that the alternative interpretation would produce "absurd"
results, or results less compatible with the reason or purpose of the statute. This, it seems to me, unquestionably involves judicial consideration
and evaluation of competing policies, and for precisely the same purpose
for which (in the context we are discussing here) agencies consider and
evaluate them-to determine which one will best effectuate the statutory
purpose. Policy evaluation is, in other words, part of the traditional judicial tool-kit that is used in applying the first step of Chevron-the step
that determines, before deferring to agency judgment, whether the law is
indeed ambiguous. Only when the court concludes that the policy furthered by neither textually possible interpretation will be clearly "better"
(in the sense of achieving what Congress apparently wished to achieve)
will it, pursuant to Chevron, yield to the agency's choice. But the reason
it yields is assuredly not that it has no constitutional competence to consider and evaluate policy.
The separation-of-powers justification can be rejected even more
painlessly by asking one simple question: If, in the statute at issue in
Chevron, Congress had specified that in all suits involving interpretation
12. See Kmiec, JudicialDeference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269, 277-78, 283, 285 (1988); cf Starr, JudicialReview in the Post-Chevron
Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 308, 312 (1986) (Chevron shifts policy-making responsibility from
courts to "democratically accountable officials" in agencies).
13. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 864-66 (1984).
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or application of the Clean Air Act the courts were to give no deference
to the agency's views, but were to determine the issue de novo, would the
Supreme Court nonetheless have acquiesced in the agency's views? I
think the answer is clearly no, which means that it is not any constitutional impediment to "policy-making" that explains Chevron.
In my view, the theoretical justification for Chevron is no different
from the theoretical justification for those pre-Chevron cases that sometimes deferred to agency legal determinations. As the D.C. Circuit,
quoting the First Circuit, expressed it: "The extent to which courts
should defer to agency interpretations of law is ultimately 'a function of
Congress' intent on the subject as revealed in the particular statutory
scheme at issue.' "14 An ambiguity in a statute committed to agency implementation can be attributed to either of two congressional desires:
(1) Congress intended a particular result, but was not clear about it; or
(2) Congress had no particular intent on the subject, but meant to leave
its resolution to the agency. When the former is the case, what we have
is genuinely a question of law, properly to be resolved by the courts.
When the latter is the case, what we have is the conferral of discretion
upon the agency, and the only question of law presented to the courts is
whether the agency has acted within the scope of its discretion-i.e.,
whether its resolution of the ambiguity is reasonable. As I read the history of developments in this field, the pre-Chevron decisions sought to
choose between (1) and (2) on a statute-by-statute basis. Hence the relevance of such frequently mentioned factors as the degree of the agency's
expertise, the complexity of the question at issue, and the existence of
rulemaking authority within the agency. All these factors make an intent
to confer discretion upon the agency more likely. Chevron, however, if it
is to be believed, replaced this statute-by-statute evaluation (which was
assuredly a font of uncertainty and litigation) with an across-the-board
presumption that, in the case of ambiguity, agency discretion is meant.
It is beyond the scope of these remarks to defend that presumption
(I was not on the Court, after all, when Chevron was decided). Surely,
however, it is a more rational presumption today than it would have been
thirty years ago-which explains the change in the law. Broad delegation to the Executive is the hallmark of the modem administrative state;
agency rulemaking powers are the rule rather than, as they once were,
the exception; and as the sheer number of modern departments and agen14. Process Gas Consumers Group v. United States Dep't of Agric., 694 F.2d 778, 791 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (en banc) (quoting Constance v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 672 F.2d 990, 995
(1st Cir. 1982)), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 905 (1983); see also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444
U.S. 555, 566-68 (1980) (Truth in Lending Act requires judicial deference to rational lawmaking by
Federal Reserve Board).
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cies suggests, we are awash in agency "expertise." If the Chevron rule is
not a 100% accurate estimation of modem congressional intent, the prior
case-by-case evaluation was not so either-and was becoming less and
less so, as the sheer volume of modem dockets made it less and less possible for the Supreme Court to police diverse application of an ineffable
rule. And to tell the truth, the quest for the "genuine" legislative intent
is probably a wild-goose chase anyway. In the vast majority of cases I
expect that Congress neither (1) intended a single result, nor (2) meant to
confer discretion upon the agency, but rather (3) didn't think about the
matter at all. If I am correct in that, then any rule adopted in this field
represents merely a fictional, presumed intent, and operates principally
as a background rule of law against which Congress can legislate.
If that is the principal function to be served, Chevron is unquestionably better than what preceded it. Congress now knows that the ambiguities it creates, whether intentionally or unintentionally, will be resolved,
within the bounds of permissible interpretation, not by the courts but by
a particular agency, whose policy biases will ordinarily be known. The
legislative process becomes less of a sporting event when those supporting and opposing a particular disposition do not have to gamble upon
whether, if they say nothing about it in the statute, the ultimate answer
will be provided by the courts or rather by the Department of Labor.
The theory that judicial acquiescence in reasonable agency determinations of law rests upon real or presumed legislative intent to confer
discretion has certain consequences which the courts do not yet seem to
have grasped. For one thing, there is no longer any justification for giving "special" deference to "long-standing and consistent" agency interpretations of law. That venerable principle made a lot of sense when we
assumed that both court and agency were searching for the one, permanent, "correct" meaning of the statute; it makes no sense when we acknowledge that the agency is free to give the statute whichever of several
possible meanings it thinks most conducive to accomplishment of the
statutory purpose. Under the latter regime, there is no apparent justification for holding the agency to its first answer, or penalizing it for a
change of mind.
Indeed, it seems to me that such an approach would deprive Chevron of one of its major advantages from the standpoint of governmental
theory, which is to permit needed flexibility, and appropriate political
participation, in the administrative process. One of the major disadvantages of having the courts resolve ambiguities is that they resolve them
for ever and ever; only statutory amendment can produce a change. If
the word "stationary source" in the Clean Air Act did not permit the
"bubble concept" today, it would not permit the "bubble concept" four
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years from now either, no matter how much the perception of whether
that concept impairs or furthers the objectives of the Act may change.
Under Chevron, however, "stationary source" can mean a range of
things, and it is up to the agency, in light of its advancing knowledge
(and also, to be realistic about it, in light of the changing political pressures that it feels from Congress and from its various constituencies) to
specify the correct meaning. If Congress is to delegate broadly, as modem times are thought to demand, it seems to me desirable that the
delegee be able to suit its actions to the times, and that continuing political accountability be assured, through direct political pressures upon the
Executive and through the indirect political pressure of congressional
oversight. All this is lost if "new" or "changing" agency interpretations
are somehow suspect. There are of course well established restrictions
upon sudden and irrational changes of interpretation through adjudication,15 and statutorily prescribed procedures (including a requirement of
reasoned justification) for changes of interpretation through rulemaking. 16 And at some point, I suppose, repeated changes back and forth
may rise (or descend) to the level of "arbitrary and capricious," and thus
unlawful, agency action. But so long as these limitations are complied
with, there seems to me no reason to value a new interpretation less than
an old one. (I should also add that the existence of a "long-standing,
consistent agency interpretation" that dates to the original enactment of
the statute may be relevant to the first step of Chevron-thatis, it may be
part of the evidence showing that the statute is in fact not ambiguous but
has a clearly defined meaning.)
Let me digress for a moment here, to note that the capacity of the
Chevron approach to accept changes in agency interpretation ungrudgingly seems to me one of the strongest indications that the Chevron approach is correct. It has always seemed to me utterly unrealistic to
believe that when an agency revises one of its interpretative regulations,
or one of the legal rules that it applies in its adjudications-when the
NLRB, for example, decides that employer action previously held to be
an "unfair labor practice" is no longer so, or when the Federal Trade
Commission amends one of its regulations to declare action previously
permitted an "unfair or deceptive trade practice"-the agency was admitting that it had "got the law wrong." And it has thus seemed to me
inappropriate to look askance at such changes, as though we were dealing with a judge who cannot make up his mind whether the rule in Shelley's Case applies or not. Rather, the agency was simply "changing the
15. See 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 20.11, at 38-39 (2d ed. 1983).
16. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983).
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law," in light of new information or even new social attitudes impressed
upon it through the political process-all within the limited range of discretion to "change the law" conferred by the governing statute. Chevron,
as I say, permits recognition of this reality.
Perhaps another distinction of yesteryear that must, in light of Chevron, be revised, is the distinction among the various manners in which
the agency makes its legal views known. Scholarly perceptions on that
point have evolved considerably over the years. Dean Landis, for example, wrote in 1938 that deference was owed to agency interpretation of
law adopted in rulemaking but not in adjudication-because the authority to make rules implied congressional delegation of discretion, whereas
authority to adjudicate did not. 17 A more enduring distinction has been
that which denies deference to agency interpretations of law "adopted for
the purpose of litigation." Certainly that makes sense under a regime in
which the agency interpretation is accepted only because the "expert"
agency is more likely than the court to reach the single "right" legal
answer. A position formulated not in the agency's adjudication process,
nor in rulemaking, but in a brief to a court, does not seem like the last
stage of an "expert" search for the truth. Once it is accepted, however,
that there are various "right" answers, and that policy and indeed even
political considerations (in the nonpartisan sense) can legitimately affect
which one the agency may choose, then it seems less important whether
the choice is made through rulemaking and adjudication,18 or rather
through a formal presentation of the agency's position in court. Of
course in many situations the agency position can only lawfully be
adopted through specified procedures; a litigating position cannot repeal
an extant regulation. And in many situations there may be reason to
doubt whether the position taken by a low-level agency litigator, or perhaps even by the general counsel, has the approval of the agency head.
And of course legal positions taken (in litigation or otherwise) with respect to matters that are not committed to the agency's administration
do not qualify for Chevron treatment anyway. But if the matter at issue
is one for which the agency has responsibility, if all requisite procedures
have been complied with, and if there is no doubt that the position urged
has full and considered approval of the agency head, it is far from selfevident that the agency's views should be denied their accustomed force
simply because they are first presented in the prosecution of a lawsuit.
The view on the other side is that even if "expertness" is no longer
as revered as it used to be, impartiality is. Whatever else an agency's
17. J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 147-49 (1938).
18. Cf INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-50 & n.30 (1987) (contrasting Board of
Immigration Appeals decisions and the government's litigation position).
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choice among the various interpretive options may be based upon, it
should not be based upon the desire to win a particular lawsuit. To avoid

the risk of this, the assumed delegation of "law-making" discretion upon
which Chevron rests should be deemed applicable only to agency deter-

minations made (with sufficient formality) in the regular course of the
agency's business, and not in litigation. Essentially this point of view is

taken by a recent consultant's report to the Administrative Conference of
the United States. 19 I would say that the jury is still out on this; one can
20
foresee future disputes on the point.

There is one final point I wish to discuss: What does it take to satisfy the first step of Chevron-that is, when is a statute ambiguous?

Chevron becomes virtually meaningless, it seems to me, if ambiguity exists only when the arguments for and against the various possible interpretations are in absolute equipoise. If nature knows of such equipoise in
legal arguments, the courts at least do not. The judicial task, every day,
consists of finding the right answer, no matter how closely balanced the

question may seem to be. In appellate opinions, there is no such thing as
a tie. If the judicial mentality that is developed by such a system were set
to answering the question, "When are the arguments for and against a
particular statutory interpretation in equipoise?," I am certain that the

response would be "almost never." If Chevron is to have any meaning,
then, congressional intent must be regarded as "ambiguous" not just
when no interpretation is even marginally better than any other, but

rather when two or more reasonable, though not necessarily equally
valid, interpretations exist. This is indeed intimated by the opinion in

Chevron-which suggests that the opposite of "ambiguity" is not
"resolvability" but rather "clarity." 2 1 Here, of course, is the chink in

Chevron's armor-the ambiguity that prevents it from being an absolutely clear guide to future judicial decisions (though still a better one

than what it supplanted). How clear is clear? It is here, if Chevron is not
19. See R. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind the Courts? 71-76, 101-03
(November 1988) (Report to the Administrative Conference of the United States).
20. Compare Church of Scientology v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153, 162 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc)
("There is some question ... whether an interpretive theory put forth only by agency counsel in
litigation, which explains agency action that could be explained on different theories, constitutes an
'agency position' for purposes of Chevron."), aff'd, 484 U.S. 9 (1987) with id. at 165 (Silberman, J.,
concurring) ("We know that the IRS has been advancing its interpretation in courts throughout the
country at least since 1982 .... To suggest in these circumstances that [this] is not an 'agency
position' is to imply that IRS counsel are mavericks, disembodied from the agency that they represent. I reject that supposition.").
21. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) ("If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter.
...
) (emphasis added); see also Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v.
NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985) ("Of course, if Congress has clearly expressed an intent contrary to
that of the Agency, our duty is to enforce the will of Congress.") (emphasis added).
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abandoned, that the future battles over acceptance of agency interpretations of law will be fought. Some indications of that can already be
found in Supreme Court opinions.
I cannot resist the temptation to tie this lecture into an impenetrable
whole, by observing that where one stands on this last point-how clear
is clear-may have much to do with where one stands on the earlier
points of what Chevron means and whether Chevron is desirable. In my
experience, there is a fairly close correlation between the degree to which
a person is (for want of a better word) a "strict constructionist" of statutes, and the degree to which that person favors Chevron and is willing to
give it broad scope. The reason is obvious. One who finds more often (as
I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its
relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering
requirement for Chevron deference exists. It is thus relatively rare that
Chevron will require me to accept an interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not personally adopt. Contrariwise, one who abhors a
"plain meaning" rule, and is willing to permit the apparent meaning of a
statute to be impeached by the legislative history, will more frequently
find agency-liberating ambiguity, and will discern a much broader range
of "reasonable" interpretation that the agency may adopt and to which
the courts must pay deference. The frequency with which Chevron will
require that judge to accept an interpretation he thinks wrong is infinitely
greater.
The law does not move in a straight line, and I will be surprised if
the implications of Chevron that I have discussed-and others that I
have not mentioned-are immediately grasped and applied by the federal
courts. The opinions we federal judges read, and the cases we cite, are
full of references to the old criteria of "agency expertise,.... the technical
and complex nature of the question presented, .... the consistent and longstanding agency position"-and it will take some time to understand that
those concepts are no longer relevant, or no longer relevant in the same
way. Indeed, it may be that, for a time at least, fidelity to the old formulations will unnaturally constrict Chevron, or even produce a retreat from
its basic perception. I tend to think, however, that in the long run Chevron will endure and be given its full scope-not so much because it represents a rule that is easier to follow and thus easier to predict (though that
is true enough), but because it more accurately reflects the reality of government, and thus more adequately serves its needs.

